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Relevance in Obsolescence: Recuperation and 
Temporality in the Work of Guy Debord and the 
Situationist International 
 
Recuperation 
 
In 2009, the French State bought an archive of Guy Debord’s work, containing his 
manuscripts, correspondence, reading notes, cinematic material and assorted personal 
effects. This purchase, which was conducted in order to prevent the archive’s sale to 
Yale, resulted in its installation in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF). In 
order for this to take place, the President of the Bibliothèque was required to dub 
Debord’s work a ‘national treasure’; Sarkozy’s minister of culture was then obliged to 
endorse that evaluation by describing Debord as a ‘great French intellectual’.1 
Unsurprisingly, these statements have proved somewhat notorious. Debord’s ‘bad 
reputation’2 once merited far more attention from the police and secret services than it 
did from academia, and the irony involved in the archive’s acquisition has not been 
lost on its many commentators: for as a journalist in Le Monde remarked, it entailed 
housing, ‘in a temple of the state’, the archives of ‘an intellectual who was critical of 
all institutions, and of society in general’.3 Yet whilst the tension between the 
archive’s content and its current location may have been sufficient to provoke 
commentary in the press, it remains the case that Debord’s work, together with that of 
the Situationist International (S.I.), has been steadily accepted and celebrated by the 
society that it opposed for years.  
This process of accommodation has proceeded apace over the past few 
decades, and Situationist material has now become a fixture of both the academic Left 
and of university teaching programmes; this despite the fact that in 1966, a French 
judge felt moved to declare Situationist ideas to be a genuine ‘threat’ to the minds of 
impressionable students, and to society at large.4 Thus whilst the transition from the 
status of ‘threat’ to that of ‘treasure’ announced by the archive’s purchase is sharp, it 
is by no means without precedent. In this regard, it has been seen by many as an 
example of ‘recuperation’:5 a term that was used by the S.I. themselves to denote the 
process through which radical material came to be neutralised through its absorption 
into the culture that it had once challenged; to identify forms of imposed collaboration 
with the cultural powers that such material had initially opposed.  
Such objections have a long history. Those concerned with defending Debord 
and the S.I.’s work have often claimed that the latter has been slowly reduced to the 
level of the very same ‘spectacle’ that it had once described and opposed: after all, 
one can now buy Situationist t-shirts and mobile phone applications, to say nothing of 
the references to this material that pepper the contemporary discourses of art, popular 
culture and the press. Recuperation is, however, not only a familiar concept, but also 
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4 Quoted in Dark Star 2001, p.9 
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an inherently problematic one; or at least it certainly can be. Its typical formulations 
assume the validity of that which they would defend (e.g. to describe Debord’s theory 
of spectacle as having become spectacular presupposes the accuracy of that theory), 
and are thus of little use within the context of a critical engagement with this material. 
Furthermore, it also invites an inherently protective and defensive posture towards the 
latter, which lends itself to the further fetishisation of Debord and the S.I.’s work, and 
therefore jars with their trenchant antipathy to such veneration.6 It is, however, 
possible to derive a rather more useful, and indeed rather less faithfully purist notion 
of recuperation from this material.  
Doing so entails addressing the notions of temporality that inflect and support 
many of Debord and the S.I.’s claims. For like so much of their work, the concept of 
recuperation does not rest upon a naïve, fixed and essentialist notion of authenticity, 
as is often assumed, but is instead premised upon a concern with history. 
Recuperation should be understood not as the corruption of a pure object, but rather as 
an aspect of the separation from historical time that Debord and the S.I. opposed. 
Addressing the concept in this regard thus provides an opportunity to highlight the 
importance and centrality of the themes of temporality and history within Debord’s 
theoretical claims. Furthermore, it can also serve to introduce their implications, as 
regards the potential pertinence, vis a vis the contemporary reception of this material, 
of the conception of historical praxis upon which so much of it rests. Once this is 
identified, one can gain a clearer sense of the manner in which Debord and the S.I.’s 
work actively invited its own critical supersession.  
 
Contextual specificity 
 
In a letter of 1966, Debord explained to a correspondent that the S.I.’s relative 
obscurity at that time was due to two factors: on the one hand, to the absence of 
‘visible [revolutionary] currents in modern society’ that sought the ‘global critique’ 
offered by the S.I.’s analyses, and which would thus adopt and forcibly impose the 
critique that the group had provided; and on the other, to the S.I.’s steadfast (albeit by 
no means entirely naïve)7 refusal of the more quiescent visibility proffered by the 
temptation of allowing the ‘cultural recuperation’8 of their ideas. Evidently, the 
group’s contemporary fame and prominence owes relatively little to the presence of 
such ‘currents’ within our own, present society, and rather more to the eventual 
victory of that latter, more problematic mode of visibility. The relevance of Debord’s 
claim here, however, is that it reflects his own and the S.I.’s pursuit of a condition of 
unity between theory and the forces that would employ it, and their consequent 
opposition to the reduction of such theory to an empty palliative for such praxis. Both 
dynamics stem from Debord’s central concept of ‘spectacle’, which can be quickly 
schematised here as the fetishistic transposition of collective agency and capacity onto 
separated, independent bodies of power (e.g. the economy, the Party, religion, 
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8 Debord 2003a, p.180 
hierarchy, etc.; or in this case, detached and neutered depictions of insurrectionary 
potential). These views should therefore be seen to inform Debord’s prescient 
prediction in 1967 that if his work were to become divorced from the ‘practical 
movement of negation within society’, which it sought to facilitate and clarify, it 
would, in consequence, become ‘just another empty formula of sociologico-political 
rhetoric’ that served only to ‘buttress the spectacular system itself’.9 It would, in other 
words, become just another means of merely describing, and thus representing that 
society’s historical negation, as opposed to functioning as an element of a practical 
movement engaged in the latter.  
 This then gives rise to the following implications. Firstly, it would seem that if 
one were to address the contemporary uses, abuses and appropriations of Debord and 
the S.I.’s work via a concept of recuperation, as many have done in the past, then it 
would not be enough to simply advocate identifying its putatively radical elements, 
with a view towards extracting them from beneath the piles of t-shirts, conferences 
and coffee-table books that have piled up upon them. If any such material were 
treated as a mere item within the museum of radical ideas, the result – if we were to 
address this material on its own terms – would still fall short of the condition of praxis 
that it both prescribed and sought to foster. Yet nor would it be enough to advocate, 
on the basis of that observation, some kind of headlong rush towards applying it in 
‘practice’ today. For if theory is indeed to form a component of a mode of historical 
praxis – or, to use Debord’s terms above, if it is to clarify and foster a ‘practical 
movement of negation’ within a given socio-historical moment – then it must, in 
consequence, be specific to the milieu and context within which it sought to intervene. 
Such theory, like the thought proper to strategy and tactics, amounts to an attempt to 
conceive and conduct a practical intervention within a specific moment: an 
intervention, in other words, within the broader, processual ‘war’ of the on-going 
mode of praxis that Debord and the S.I. identified with both communism and the path 
taken towards it. Therefore, just as no general would use the same plans in each and 
every engagement, regardless of changes in the forces and terrain involved, so too 
does it seem problematic to impose a fifty-year old body of theory onto our own 
current circumstances; particularly given the fact that the theory in question places 
tremendous emphasis on the need for change, intervention, and the contextual 
specificity of ‘historical thought’. If addressed with these themes in mind, Debord and 
the S.I.’s work can be seen to clearly invite its own future supersession qua its 
function as a finite moment of intervention (e.g. Debord’s statement in 1968 that ‘we 
have never considered the S.I. to be a goal in itself,’ but rather ‘a moment of historical 
activity’;10 or as he put it in 1969, whilst reflecting on the events of the previous May: 
‘From now on we are sure of a satisfactory consummation of our activities: the S.I. 
will be superseded’).11 To place this in relation to the example with which we began: 
although the BNF’s purchase of the archive is by no means without paradox and 
tension, it seems productive to actually use its content as a resource towards a critical 
and contextual evaluation of Debord and the S.I.’s work. And rather than advocating 
the continued applicability of the group’s analyses, focus should presumably fall upon 
the manner in which they invited their own critical assessment and supersession.  
 Debord in particular placed great stress on the importance of the judgment of 
history vis a vis the evaluation of the efficacy and validity of bodies of radical theory. 
When addressing his own, one might therefore point to the fact that the S.I.’s 
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promised revolution ultimately failed to transpire. One could also ask whether the 
transition of Debord’s work from the status of ‘threat’ to that of a ‘treasure’ reflects 
theoretical failings within it; whether there are issues or theoretical problems within it 
that render it susceptible to the diminution of its radicalism, and which may have thus 
eased its current endorsement and reduction to the level of  ‘just another empty 
formula of sociologico-political rhetoric’. Furthermore: if the ostensible ‘threat’ that it 
once posed stemmed from its purported connection to a radical milieu that has now 
receded into our own past, an enquiry into whatever oppositional elements may still 
reside within it should presumably address the conceptual mechanics that inform its 
underlying concern with praxis. This is because the latter implies further engagements 
and interventions, beyond those developed by Debord and the S.I. themselves.  
These observations amount to the following contentions: a) there may indeed 
be flaws within this material that undermine, or can be seen in retrospect to have 
undermined its critical efficacy; but nonetheless, b) the conceptions of temporality 
and praxis that support it may remain of interest, not least because they seem to point 
beyond Debord and the S.I.’s extant formulations, and towards the generation of new, 
more contemporary theoretical positions.  
The remainder of this text will present some initial indications in support of 
those contentions, whilst also attempting to develop the notion of praxis that the latter 
proposition entails. We will begin with a few general comments on the development 
and aims of Debord and the S.I.’s work; having done so, we will then look at the 
nature and limitations of Debord’s theoretical claims. Yet having indicated some of 
the problems that can be found within that body of theory, we will move on to 
consider Debord’s views on time and history in a little more detail. This can afford a 
degree of insight into the connections between his interpretation of Hegelian Marxism 
and his interest in strategy, and can thereby highlight the notion of praxis that inheres 
within this material. We will conclude by returning to the bearing that these views on 
temporality and agency may have upon the contemporary status and reception of 
Debord and the S.I.’s work.   
 
The realisation of philosophy 
 
The S.I. officially began life in 1957, and arose from the amalgamation of several 
avant-garde groups concerned with the separation and detachment of art and culture 
from everyday life. Their initial programme, as expressed in Debord’s seminal 
‘Report on the Construction of Situations’, was to apply art’s creativity and 
imagination within everyday life itself, through using the techniques developed within 
architecture and the arts as means of shaping and constructing lived experience. As 
the group’s theoretical work developed, this ambition came to be increasingly 
inflected with Young Hegelian themes pertaining to the supersession of the human 
subject’s detachment from his or her own alienated powers, capacities and activity. 
Marx’s early concern with ‘realizing [verwirklichen]’12 philosophy in lived praxis 
became central to this, as the static, passive detachment that Marx had attributed to 
philosophy was seen to echo that of art’s detachment from life (hence the S.I.’s 
contention that: ‘Just as in the first half of the nineteenth century revolutionary theory 
arose out of philosophy … so now it is going to rise once again out of modern art and 
poetry’).13 Where philosophy had contemplated life, attempting to define its on-going, 
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fluid movement by way of stable and effectively static truths, art had depicted it, 
producing similarly static images thereof. Both were thus marked by the distinction 
between known object and knowing subject, insofar as the actual movement of lived 
practice constituted an object of enquiry that could only be figured through 
conceptual or artistic portrayals of that movement: through representations that 
remained detached from the latter, but which nonetheless purported to express its true 
nature, beauty and potential.  
In rectifying this separation, the realisation of art in lived praxis would 
augment the historical agency to which Marx’s early critique of Hegel had given 
initial theoretical expression, thereby allowing that agency to flourish. For whilst 
Marx had inaugurated a conception of genuinely self-determinate praxis, within 
which human thought would take an active role in changing the world rather than 
reflecting upon the latter’s ostensibly automatic transformation (as described by 
Hegel’s idealism), the Situationists would grant this agency a greater capacity for self-
determination. The communist project could not, therefore, be a drive towards more 
equitable forms of labour: instead, and insofar as the Situationist revolution would 
actualise the capacities and possibilities afforded by modern society’s technical 
abilities, that agency would now tend towards the abolition of work per se, as the 
provision of primary material needs through automation would allow it to shape itself 
as fully and creatively as possible according to its own subjective desires. Thus the 
more utopian14 aspects of the S.I.’s goals were not simply a romantic gloss upon an 
essentially traditional communist project, but rather a marker of their opposition to 
‘actually existing socialism’. For example: Lukács, discussing the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, once warned that ‘Freedom cannot represent a value in itself,’ and that it 
must ‘serve the rule of the proletariat, not the other way round’;15 the S.I., reversing 
the Surrealists' own famous assertion that poetry must be put at the service of 
revolution, claimed that ‘the point’ was in fact ‘to put revolution at the service of 
poetry’, as doing so would ensure that ‘the revolution does not betray its own 
project’.16 The unification of subject and object would not therefore be embodied in a 
bureaucratic party (as with Lukács), but would rather take the form of human subjects 
shaping themselves and their world according to their own wishes.  
 
Spectacle 
 
This then brings us to Debord’s theory of spectacle, which essentially describes the 
deprivation of such a condition of engagement in historical time. His mature 
theoretical work addresses the separation of acting subjects from their own capacities 
and actions, understood in terms of their detachment from their capacity to shape and 
direct their own histories. This is based upon an essentially Young Hegelian concern 
with alienated, detached bodies of collective power – Bakunin, Cieszkowski, 
Feuerbach and Stirner are all key figures for Debord – albeit one that was no less 
deeply inflected by Marx’s early emphasis on the derivation of all such forms of 
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separated power from a fragmented and contradictory organisation of socio-economic 
activity. The central contention of Debord’s conception of spectacle, therefore, is that 
social atomisation tends towards the generation of bodies of power that become 
detached from, and indeed come to govern and dominate, the individuals concerned: a 
problematic that had been brought to an extreme by modern capitalism, which is itself 
composed of social relations that are characterised by individualisation, and which 
give rise to society’s total subordination to its own economy.  
 The Society of the Spectacle (1967) thus presents an analysis of contemporary 
capitalism. The spectacle, he writes, ‘corresponds to the historical moment at which 
the commodity completes its colonisation of social life’.17 However, that ‘moment’ 
was seen to have arisen from a long process of historical development, through which 
the problematic of separation described above steadily deepened.18 In addition, 
Debord’s attempt to describe society as a totality, unified under the governing, 
defining rubric of spectacle, entailed gathering together a host of different 
phenomena: ideology, dogma, religion, commodities, the Party, etc., were all cast as 
spectacular in this sense, insofar as all entailed concentrated forms of separated 
power. Ultimately, the entirety of lived social activity was held to have become 
dominated and shaped by the alienated social power and estranged activity that 
comprises capitalist value, which had come to regulate and order a world within 
which human subjects had become reduced to the status of passive, contemplative 
objects: to mere ‘spectators’ of a history and social existence that had come to be 
shaped by a sovereign economy, rather than by their own collective and conscious 
designs.  
This theory is, however, not without problems. Debord’s mature account of 
spectacle – i.e. that advanced in 1967’s The Society of the Spectacle – casts all social 
practice within modern capitalist societies as having become effectively equivalent 
with all others, insofar as all elements of social life had come to be similarly shaped 
by capital’s dictates, and thus similarly alienated from the individuals that conduct 
them. Yet although the theory draws heavily on the Marx of Capital in order to 
formulate these claims, and although it emphasises alienation and social 
fragmentation, it tends at times towards effacing the latter’s presentation of capital as 
an antagonistic set of social relations based around the fulcrum of class opposition in 
the wage-relation.  The concept of spectacle lends itself to a dichotomy between an 
alienated consciousness on the one hand, and a homogenised world on the other: 
production, circulation, work, leisure, etc., are posed as equivalent elements of the 
world faced by that consciousness. On the one hand, this serves to emphasise the 
sheer scale of modern capitalism’s domination of human reality; some have thus 
praised the S.I.’s focus on the everyday rather than on the classical wage-relation as a 
virtue, not least as it can seem to afford a route beyond a traditionally conceived class 
struggle.19 Furthermore, its total condemnation of modern society implies a radical, 
revolutionary break with the entirety of its mode of social existence. Yet the 
homogeneity and implicit dichotomy noted above, which derive from the primacy that 
the concept of spectacle accords to a detached, contemplative subjective 
consciousness, entail that little purchase is offered on the means by which any such 
revolutionary break might be made. At its weakest points, this is a perspective that 
reduces to an abstract opposition between the ‘directly lived’20 ‘life’ that Debord and 
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the S.I. sought to foster, versus the ‘non-life’21 of spectacle. His theory can thus seem 
rather more oriented towards capital’s subjective effects than towards its concrete 
causes. This then brings us to contention outlined earlier, concerning the potential 
interest and implications of the theory of praxis that can be discerned within this 
material.  
 
Time and history 
 
Debord’s work is greatly inflected by an essentially existential problematic 
concerning the importance of self-determinacy. Underlying all of his theses about 
capitalism and its culture, and indeed defining the very principle of spectacle itself, is 
a concern with the revolutionary re-appropriation of the ability to self-consciously 
direct the moments of experience that compose and delimit subjective existence. This 
basic premise was cast as the defining concept for an entire historical totality: 
capitalism’s development was held to have rendered humanity’s power to consciously 
shape its world greater than at any other time in the past; yet at the same time, the 
complete subordination of lived activity to its dictates had caused that power to 
become further removed from its producers than ever before. As indicated above, 
modern society was thus presented as having engendered a demand for a ‘higher’, 
more radical form of communism than that of the purely economic struggles of the 
past. This contradiction, and the defining problematic of spectatorship that it entailed, 
was viewed as giving rise to an immanent, potentially society-wide radicalism, driven 
towards the supersession of all instances of the alienation of collective agency and 
power. Struggles against the modern spectacle would thus make clearly and self-
consciously explicit the purportedly implicit drive towards radical self-determinacy 
that Debord held to have inhered within all prior instances of insurrection (for 
example: the ‘evolution of class society into the spectacular organisation of non-life 
… obliges the revolutionary project to become visibly what it always was 
essentially’).22 This demand for free self-determinacy, qua the reclamation of a power 
to shape the world, essentially amounts to a drive towards the reclamation of history 
itself: not simply in terms of appropriating a culture’s memory of its own past, but 
rather as the potential to shape the future.  
Debord’s key concerns with time, temporality and history run throughout his 
oeuvre, and informed the inclusion of no less than two chapters on time in The Society 
of the Spectacle. These chapters are rarely discussed – perhaps as they have little 
obvious place within the popular media-centric interpretations of Debord’s work, 
which tend to cast it as a simple critique of the mass media – but they are nonetheless 
important; for as Debord indicates in his correspondence, they serve to present 
‘historical time’ as the ‘milieu and goal of the proletarian revolution’.23 Debord is no 
Kantian: time, in his view, exists independently of humanity. History, however, as the 
form taken by the human consciousness of time’s passage, emerges only with the 
advent of human beings.24 The ‘historical time’ referred to in the quotation above is 
thus a consciously experienced progression of events within time, and in Debord’s 
fullest uses of the phrase25 it denotes the pro-active, self-conscious and self-
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determinate direction of such experience. His presentation of such a time as the 
‘milieu and goal’ of revolution thus reflects the sense in which the communism that 
he and the S.I. sought and advocated, at least during their more Hegelian and Marxian 
period in the 1960s, is best understood as a condition of collective historical praxis. It 
was, in other words, to be an on-going process, in which a form of unity with time 
would be established by virtue of the self-determinate quality of actions undertaken 
within it. The supersession of spectacular separation from the power to shape and 
affect history would thus afford an ‘end of pre-history’,26 insofar as lived historical 
time would cease to be driven and directed by alienated economic power, but would 
instead become a conscious, collective project.  
Debord in fact states in The Society of the Spectacle that the human subject is 
‘one [identique] with time’,27 because time, in his view, is ‘the medium in which the 
subject realises himself in losing himself, becoming other in order to become truly 
himself [pour devenir la vérité de lui-même]’.28 The S.I.’s constructed situations were 
to afford, or would at least pre-figure the unity with time that these positions entailed; 
hence the sense in which the realisation of art would entail the creation of transitory 
moments of life rather than permanent objects (‘The point’, Debord once wrote, ‘is to 
produce ourselves rather than things that enslave us’).29 For the same reasons, the 
success of constructed situations could ‘reside only in their fleeting effect [leur effet 
passager]’.30 They were to be ‘without a future’, and would exist only as 
‘passageways [lieux de passage]’; for ‘we care nothing,’ Debord claimed, ‘about the 
permanence of art or of anything else.’31 It might also be noted that this openness to 
time informed the aspects of play associated with Situationist activity. Insofar as the 
movement of time entailed the advent of contingencies and unforeseen eventualities, 
the experience thereof would involve a ludic dimension, which Debord and the S.I. 
sought to foster. Hence Debord’s claim that the ‘Situationist attitude’ consisted of 
‘gambling on the flow [fuite] of time’.32 Furthermore, this openness to contingency 
also informed his interest in strategy.  
 
Strategy and praxis 
 
It’s often noted that the history of the S.I. can be split into two distinct periods: their 
early, formative years, in which their claims and positions were more influenced by 
their avant-garde origins; and a second period, dating from the early 1960s onwards, 
in which they became increasingly concerned with the development of revolutionary 
social theory. Some commentators have adopted something rather similar as regards 
Debord himself. Noting the distinction in tone between 1967’s The Society of the 
Spectacle and his Comments on the Society of the Spectacle of 1988, some have 
distinguished the icy utopianism of the former from an ostensibly more melancholic 
and defeatist later period. There is in fact no such defeatism in Debord’s later work; 
only an appraisal of the complexities and confusions of conducting large-scale radical 
politics within the context of modern society. It’s thus rather more productive to view 
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this later period as being characterised not by a turn towards the melancholic, but 
rather towards the strategic. Around the mid-1970s – and thus after the S.I.’s auto-
dissolution in 1972 – Debord’s long-standing interest in this topic seems to have taken 
on a more pronounced role. For example, he writes in a letter of 1974 that:  
 
The principle work that, it appears to me, has to be engaged in now  – as the complementary contrary 
to The Society of the Spectacle, which described frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit 
within it) – is the theory of historical action. It [the task] is to advance, in its moment, which has come, 
strategic theory. At this stage, and to speak schematically here, the basic theoreticians to retrieve and 
develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautréamont, but Thucydides – Machiavelli – Clausewitz.33 
 
 This ‘theory of historical action’ constitutes an extension of the Hegelian 
Marxism that Debord developed in the 1960s; a claim that can perhaps be illustrated 
here with an anecdote. Giorgio Agamben, who had the rare honour of being one of the 
few modern intellectuals whom Debord did not despise, recalls in an essay that he 
once told Debord that he considered him to be a philosopher. Debord responded by 
saying ‘I’m not a philosopher, I’m a strategist.’34 Agamben does not make this point, 
and admittedly, nor does Debord, or at least not explicitly within his published works 
– like almost all of the positions set out here, it has to be inferred and reconstructed 
from the scattered evidence that he provides us – but his response to that question was 
no doubt due to his view that strategy is the form to be taken by philosophy when it 
comes to be actualized, following Marx’s critique of Hegel, in historical praxis. This 
informs his enigmatic references to ‘dialectical, strategic thought’35 in his 
correspondence, and indeed his contention, made in the personal notes that are now 
stored in the BNF’s archive, that ‘to think dialectically and to think strategically’ is 
‘the same thing’.36 Strategy and dialectics are the ‘same thing’, because thought 
engaged in praxis must function as a means of engaging with shifting, conflicting and 
developing circumstances. The content of that archive can in fact serve as a further 
illustration of these points. When reading – and Debord clearly read an extraordinary 
amount – he would write, in tiny, meticulous handwriting, quotations, notes and ideas 
on small cards and pieces of paper. He built up an enormous collection of these fiches 
lectures throughout his life, all of which are now carefully catalogued and stored in 
boxes, folders and sub-folders in the BNF. It seems significant that although there is 
an entire box of material on Hegel, and a slightly larger box on Marx and Marxism, 
both are dwarfed by two whole boxes of notes on strategy and military history. 
Strategy was evidently the major concern; but then that is because Debord’s 
conception thereof was in fact an iteration of his Hegelian Marxism. In effect, his 
work advocates the practical, Marxian actualisation of French Hegelianism’s 
characteristic focus on Hegel’s links between consciousness, negativity and 
temporality. The result is a means of thinking history qua self-conscious self-creation. 
 Once the link between Debord’s strategic concerns and his views on Hegel, 
Marx and praxis is made, Debord’s oeuvre can then be seen to contain not only a 
critical theory of contemporary capitalism, but also a theory of political praxis geared 
towards the negotiation and contestation of the latter. Debord and the S.I.’s work 
could then serve as the starting pointy for a theory of political agency.  
 There is in fact a sense in which Debord’s views on time and history imply 
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that very project. In his 1978 film In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, and 
whilst rejecting the notion that he would construct theoretical systems as if they were 
timeless, static philosophies, Debord stated that theories are in fact ‘only made to die 
in the war of time’: for like ‘military units’, they ‘must be sent into battle at the right 
moment’, and have to be continually 'replaced, because they are constantly being 
worn out, by their decisive victories even more than by their partial defeats’.37 Like 
works of military strategy, theories are attempts to clarify a given moment: their task 
is to afford an understanding of a political and economic landscape and to provide 
insight into the forces ranged upon it, so as to further the work of those that would 
hasten its demise. Clearly, any such theory can only be properly valid within the 
context that it seeks to articulate. It cannot therefore be arbitrarily imposed upon other 
situations. For the same reasons, a theory’s validity would be undermined if its 
success and validity turned it into a discrete object that could be considered and 
discussed in abstraction from the praxis to which it pertained (hence Debord’s 
prediction, noted earlier, that his theory could become ‘just another empty formula of 
sociologico-political rhetoric’).38 The theory of spectacle is of course only one such 
theory, and Debord situates it within a historical succession of differing, contextual 
views on the problems and politics of differing circumstances. Thus the ideas that 
support it – i.e. these notions of time and history, and their attendant demand for 
thought’s continual engagement in the latter – actively point beyond it.   
 Granted, Debord seems to have felt very secure in the lasting validity of his 
own theory. In 1979, and in his preface to the fourth Italian edition of The Society of 
the Spectacle, he claimed that he had ‘no doubt’ that the book’s theses would remain 
valid ‘until the end of the century and even beyond’.39 This confidence does not 
however entirely contradict these views on history and agency, but rather 
compliments them, as it was based on the contention that his theory had not simply 
depicted a historical moment as a discrete, static, object of enquiry, but had instead 
given voice to that moment’s own immanent negation. Quoting one of Marx’s most 
famous comments on the Hegelian dialectic,40 he claimed that he had ‘understood the 
constitutive factors of the spectacle “in motion, and consequently by their transient 
aspect as well”, that is to say, by envisaging the whole of the historical movement that 
has been able to edify this order, and which is now beginning to dissolve it’.41 His 
theoretical work is thus not simply subject to time and history, insofar as it is a 
particular theory within time: it is rather subject to them insofar as it wants to be one 
with their movement. It is an attempt, in other words, to form part of ‘l'intelligence’ 
(to quote a rather apposite French translation of that same passage from Marx) of the 
‘négation fatale’ and ‘destruction nécessaire’ of all positive, existing forms.42  
 
Relevance in obsolescence 
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Clearly, the issues highlighted above sit rather uncomfortably alongside some of the 
contemporary tendencies towards treating this material as a discrete body of work that 
can be readily imposed upon our present. The latter view is much less evident within 
the currents of Marxian thought that address Debord and the S.I.’s work, as they tend 
to treat it more as a landmark within the history of radical ideas: as a corpus that 
prefigures elements of Neue Marx-Lektüre and Wertkritik, and which can be framed, 
albeit rather less convincingly, as a boundary marker for the historical purview of the 
classical workers’ movement.43 However, within the broader realms of critical and 
continental theory – and indeed within much of the extant commentary on his own 
and the S.I.’s work – Debord’s theory often tends to be presented either as a defining 
synthesis of our modern ills, or as a remarkably prescient description of their inherent 
dynamic.44 Agamben, referred to above, claimed that Debord possessed a ‘prophetic 
clairvoyance’,45 insofar as that ‘the contemporary phase of capitalism’ is without 
doubt ‘the society of the spectacle’;46 likewise, Hardt and Negri have described The 
Society of the Spectacle as ‘perhaps the best articulation, in its own delirious way, of 
the contemporary consciousness of the triumph of capital’.47 Other writers have 
echoed each other in claiming that that book is now ‘more relevant than ever as a 
diagnostic tool in political analysis’,48 that it possesses more ‘explanatory power … 
than ever’,49 and that ‘never before’ has it seemed ‘quite as relevant as it does now’.50 
Such contentions sit rather awkwardly with the essentially strategic, and thus 
historically and contextually situated role that this body of theoretical work was 
originally intended to perform. For if theory is to function as strategy, then it must be 
specific to the struggles and moments that it would articulate and traverse. If it is not 
superseded in tandem with changing circumstances – i.e. if it remains in place beyond 
its period of relevance and efficacy, perhaps due to its success or celebrity – then 
theory becomes dogma, and praxis gives way to spectacle. Therefore if a work such 
as The Society of the Spectacle is to be relevant today, in a manner that accords with 
its author’s original intentions – as opposed to those of its contemporary appropriators 
– then its pertinence must be found in its relative obsolescence; and whilst the 
supersession that this entails must obviously be practical as well as theoretical, 
Contributions might be drawn from  addressing Debord and the S.I.’s work on its own 
terms, by way of a consideration of the ideas that underlie, inform, and seemingly 
point beyond it. 
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